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A Special Rule for
Compound Protection
for DNA-sequences -
Impact of the ECJ
"Monsanto" decision
on Patent Practice
Jan B. Krauss* and Toshiko Takenaka**
I. Introduction
On October 29, 2010, the U.S. Department
of Justice filed an amicus brief in the
Myriad case, an appeal from the U.S.
District Court for the Southern District of
New York in which all asserted claims of
controversial gene patents were found
invalid.' The brief highlighted a stark con-
trast between the positions of different
government sectors in the same jurisdic-
* Dr. Jan B. Krauss, Patent Attorney in Munich, Germany
tion, the United States, with respect to the
scope of patent eligible subject matter
under 35 USC §101 and the interpretation
of that statute by the Supreme Court. The
brief urged the appellate court to invalidate
claims relating to an isolated DNA
sequence because it is a natural phenome-
non, while acknowledging the United
States Patent and Trademark Office
("USPTO") examination practice granting
patents on such claims.
** Toshiko Takenaka, Ph.D., Professor of Law, Director, Center for Advanced Study and Research on Intellectual Property,
University
I Ass'n for Molecular Pathology v. United States PTO, 702 F. Supp. 2d, 181, 94 IUSPQ2d 683 (S.D.N.Y. 2010).
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It is even more challenging for courts
and patent offices in different juris-
dictions to take identical positions on
interpreting the same statute. The
European Union ("EU") and its member
states enacted the Biotech-Directive
("Directive") more than a decade ago to
clarify and harmonize the patentability
and scope of protection for biotechnolog-
ical inventions under national law.2 The
member states, such as Germany and the
Netherlands, consequently had to revise
their national patent laws in order to
implement the Directive requirements.
Although not all members of European
Patent Convention ("EPC") are members
of the EU and the European Patent
Organization, the organization of EPC
members is a separate institution from
the EU. The EPC has also been revised to
incorporate patentability-related articles
of the Directive.? Because of this, patent
offices and courts in EU member states
have to interpret and apply the language
of the Directive when dealing with
biotechnological inventions. However,
interpretation of the language in the
Directive by national legislators and
courts has not been uniform. Im-
plementing the Directive in national
laws is controversial because patent pro-
fessionals and scholars disagree as to
what the obligations are under the
Directive. As a result, important issues
such as the question of whether DNA-
sequences as natural compounds are
patent eligible, the meaning of "gene
patents" and "biological material," and
the extent of the scope of protection for
patents on genes and DNA sequences
remains unclear.
In Europe, the recent decision by the
European Court of Justice (ECJ) in
Monsanto v. Cefetra ("Monsanto") has trig-
gered extensive debates among European
patent professionals and scholars. In
Monsanto, the ECJ interpreted Article 9 of
the Directive when deciding on infringe-
ment of a plant-based gene patent.
Although the asserted claims are directed
to an isolated DNA sequence, i.e., a com-
pound without any limitation in view of its
function or purpose, the ECJ made it clear
that a compound infringes the patent only
if the compound performs the function or
purpose disclosed in the specification.
Accordingly, the ECJ applied a "function-
limited" or "purpose-bound" protection
for DNA sequence patents, even when a
claim does not include any limitation
regarding the function or purpose that the
sequence performs.
At first sight, Monsanto only deals with
the scope of protection for a DNA sequence
patent, i.e. legal issues in determining
infringement. Since the EPC applies only
to the patent granting procedure, the
impact should be limited to patent enforce-
ment in national courts. However, some
aspects of ECJ's discussions in Monsanto
may also result in a significant impact on
the patentability of a claim directed to a
DNA-sequence as a compound. Such
impact extends to not only national level
but also international level including both
EU and EPC member states. In other
words, EU member states must take the
ECJ case law into account because of their
2 Directive 98/44/EC of the European Parliament and the Commission of July 6, 1998 regarding the legal protection of biotechno-
logical inventions, 01 L 213 of July 30,1998, p. 13-21
3 See EPC 2000: Rules 26 to 29
4 See European Court of Justice (ECJ) Decision of July 6, 2010; Case C-428/08
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EU membership and ratification of the
Directive. ECJ Case Law also has a signifi-
cant influence on EPC member states that
are non-EU member states because Rule 26
(1) EPC requires interpretation of the EPC
in view of the Directive.'
This article will analyze the Monsanto
decision, and criticize the ECJ's interpre-
tation of Article 9 as being incomplete, in
particular for failing to take account of all
articles and recitals in the Directive relat-
ing to the scope of protection. It will
argue that applying the concept of a func-
tion-limited protection is unnecessary if a
claim directed to an isolated DNA
sequence is properly interpreted. It will
also discuss the possible impact not only
on the protection scope but also on the
patentability of gene patents.
II. Background and
Facts in Monsanto
Monsanto is the owner of European
Patent EP 0 546 090 ("'090 Patent") direct-
ed to an isolated DNA-sequence, which
renders a soybean plant resistant against
the herbicide glyphosate when it is intro-
duced into the plant.' The specification of
the '090 Patent discloses how the isolated
DNA sequence functions in order to pro-
vide the resistance to soybean plants.
Such herbicide resistant soybean plants
are called Roundup Ready' or RR ("RR"),
and are commonly used in agriculture.
Although Monsanto secured patent pro-
tection in EPC countries, including the
Netherlands, through the '090 patent,
Monsanto did not have a corresponding
patent in Argentina. RR soybeans were
harvested and processed into meal in
Argentina, and was then subsequently
imported into Europe by Cafetra and
Toepfer. While the imported RR soybean
meal contained the patented DNA-
sequence, it could no longer function as a
resistance marker and was merely con-
tained as a "residue" in the soybean meal.
Nevertheless, Monsanto initiated an action
to block the import of the meal into the
European Union. Monsanto filed for an
injunctive relief, asserting infringement of
the '090 Patent at the Court of The Hague
(Rechtbank's-Gravenhage) when the RR
soybean meal arrived in the Netherlands.
The Court of The Hague found that the
imported RR soybean meal no longer per-
forms the herbicide resistant function,
and consequently held that the meal
would not infringe the '090 Patent. The
Hague Court rejected Monsanto's argu-
ment that mere presence of the patented
DNA sequence in the meal would be suf-
ficient to uphold a claim of infringement
as long as the sequence had performed
the herbicide resistance function in the
past and could perform the function again
after it would have been isolated from the
soybean meal and transferred into a liv-
ing material. The Hague Court interpret-
5 The decision was consequently published in the OJ EPO 8-9/2010, pages 428 to 447
6 Claims 1, 5 and 6 of the granted EP patent read (Please note that only the scope of Claim 6 was referred to ECJ for interpretation
of Article 9 of the Directive):
1. An isolated DNA sequence encoding a class II EPSPS enzyme, said enzyme being an EPSPS enzyme having a K. for phospho-
enolpyruvate (PEP) between 1-150 pM and a K,(glyphosate)/K,(PEP) ratio between 3-500, which enzyme is capable of reacting
with antibodies raised against a class II EPSPS enzyme selected from the group consisting of the enzymes of SEQ ID NO:3, and
SEQ ID NO:5.
5. An isolated DNA sequence encoding a protein which exhibits EPSPS activity wherein said protein is capable of reacting with
antibodies raised against a Class II EPSPS enzyme, selected from the group consisting of the enzymes of SEQ ID NO:3 and SEQ
ID NO:5.
6. The DNA sequence of Claim 5 wherein said antibodies are raised against a Class II EPSPS enzyme of SEQ ID NO:3.
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ed the extent of patent protection for
biotechnological inventions under Article
9 of the Directive and the Dutch Patent
Law, Article 53a(3 7 which corresponds to
Article 9.* The court concluded that the
DNA sequence at stake must perform the
expected function, although it does not
continuously have to perform the func-
tion in cases where it is necessary to "acti-
vate" the function of a sequence using
certain conditions, such as heat, dryness,
or disease.
However, the Court of The Hague was
not sure if the language in Article 9 of the
Directive would be sufficiently clear to
support the function-limited protection as
applied. In order to avoid a conflict with
the Directive, the Court stayed the
infringement proceeding and referred
four questions to the EPJ.9 Out of the four
questions, the question regarding the
appropriateness of the function-limited
protection is most significant as an issue
with a significant impact on the value of
patents covering DNA sequences. The
Hague Court also asked whether EU
member states could provide an absolute
compound protection for DNA sequence
patents regardless of the function of the
sequence in case the ECJ followed the
concept of function-limited protection,
and whether the function-limited protec-
tion would apply also to DNA sequence
patents which were issued before the
effective date of the Directive.
In the EU court system, an Advocate-
General is assigned to each case for con-
ducting research on legal issues involved
in the case. After conducting the neces-
sary research, the assigned Advocate-
General publishes his or her opinion in
favor of a certain outcome before the
court issues its judgment. In Monsanto,
an opinion was authored by Advocate-
General Mengozzi, and issued on March
9, 2010.1' He focused on the verb tense in
Article 9 of the Directive and concluded
that the scope of protection for a patent
on an isolated DNA sequence should be
limited by the function as described in
the specification in the context of indus-
trial applicability."
7 Article 53(a) of Dutch Patent Law reads:
1. In respect of a patent on a biological material possessing specific characteristics as a result of the invention, the exclusive right
shall extend to any biological material derived from that biological material through propagation or multiplication in an identi-
cal or divergent form and possessing those same characteristics.
2. In respect of a patent on a process that enables a biological material to be produced possessing specific characteristics as a
result of the invention, the exclusive right shall extend to biological material directly obtained through that process and to any
other biological material derived from the directly obtained biological material through propagation or multiplication in an
identical or divergent form and possessing those same characteristics.
3. In respect of a patent on a product containing or consisting of genetic information, the exclusive right shall extend to all materi-
al in which the product is incorporated and in which the genetic information is contained and performs its function
8 Article 9 of the Directive reads: "The protection conferred by a patent on a product containing or consisting of genetic information
shall extend to all material save as provided in Article 5(1) in which the product is incorporated and in which the genetic information is
contained and performs its function."
9 C-428/08, Reference for A Preliminary Ruling from the Rechtsbank's-Gravenhage (Netherlands) of 29 September 2008, 01 C 313
of 06.12.2008, p. 16 (2008).
10 C-428/08, Opinion of Advocate General, available at http://curia.europa.eu/juisp/cgi-
bin/form.pl?lang=EN&Submit=Submit&numaff=C-428/08
11 Article 52(1) EFC requires that European patents shall be granted for any inventions, in all fields of technology, provided that
they are new, involve an inventive step and are susceptible of industrial application. Further, Rule 29(3) EPC requires that the industrial
application of a sequence or a partial sequence of a gene must be disclosed in the patent application (at the time of filing).
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Ill. ECJ Decision: Interpretation
of Article 9 of Directive
The ECJ agreed with the Advocate-
General and upheld The Hague court's
interpretation of Article 9.12 In doing so,
the Court also relied on the present verb
tense in Article 9 of the Directive, which
reads "the protection conferred by a
patent on a product containing or consist-
ing of genetic information shall extend to
all materials save as provided in Article
5(1), in which the generic information is
contained and performs its function"
(emphasis added). With respect to genetic
information, such as the isolated DNA
sequence covered by the '090 patent,
patent protection only extends to a materi-
al (here, the plant) which contains the
genetic information only when the infor-
mation performs the function of the inven-
tion; in Monsanto the function is protecting
the material (plant) from the effect of her-
bicide." Because the gene in the RR soy-
bean meal no longer performs the function
of the invention, i.e. the herbicide resist-
ance effect, the protection of '090 Patent
does not extend to the soybean meal. To
claim protection under Article 9 of the
Directive for a material, it would be insuf-
ficient that the genetic information, such
as an isolated DNA in the material, once
had performed the function of invention
in the past (i.e., in the living soybean-
plant.) It would also be insufficient that
the genetic information would/could
resume the function of the invention if it is
isolated from the material that the patent
protection is asserted against, and intro-
duced into a new material, such as a living
organism. In the latter case, the new mate-
rial would be different from the material
that the patent protection is asserted
against. Therefore, the patent owner of
the genetic information may enforce the
patent under Article 9 only with respect to
the new material. 4
As a result, the ECJ interpreted the
scope of protection of Claim 6 of the '090
patent directing at a DNA sequence as a
compound narrower than its literal claim
scope. Such restrictive interpretation for a
compound claim is, nevertheless, clearly
in conflict with the current case law of
many EPC member states such as
Germany." Article 69 EPC makes clear
that the claims determine the extent of
patent protection by using the description
and drawings as tools for interpretation.' 6
In Monsanto, the asserted claims are
directed to a DNA sequence compound
without any limitation on the function
that the sequence performs, and thus the
compound must be protected independent-
ly from its function".
Monsanto tried to distinguish the liter-
al protection for a patented DNA
sequence as such as provided by Article
1(1) of the Directive" from the extended
12 C-428/08 Judgment of the Court (Grand Chamber), 6 July 2010, OJ C 234, 28.08.2010, 7 (2010) (Monsanto ECJ Judgment)
13 See id. paragraph 36.
14 See id. paragraph 39.
15 Such as, for example, in the decisions of the Federal Court of Justice (BGH), Imidazoline, GRUR 1972, 541, Antivirusmittel GRJR
1987, 794, and recently Mehrgangnabe, GRUR 2008, 779. There is no case-law of the BGH specifically related to DNA sequences.
16 Article 69(1) EPC reads: "The extent of the protection conferred by a European patent or a European patent application shall be
determined by the claims. Nevertheless, the description and drawings shall be used to interpret the claims."
17 But see Tilman, GRUR 2004, 561, 564
18 Which reads: "Member States shall protect biotechnological inventions under national patent law. They shall, if necessary,
adjust their national patent law to take account of the provisions of this Directive."
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protection for a material including such
DNA sequence under Article 9, and
argued that with respect to the DNA
sequence in the accused soybean meal the
former protection would be relevant." It
emphasized that the scope of protection
for a DNA sequence should be absolute
regardless of the function of the inven-
tion. When rejecting this argument, the
ECJ relied on Recital 23 in the preamble of
the Directive.20 Recital 23 makes clear that
DNA sequences contain technical infor-
mation and thus are patentable only
when the DNA performs a function. The
Court also relied on Recital 24, which
basically requires a description of a func-
tion in the specification to support indus-
trial applicability if a claim is directed to a
sequence or partial sequence of gene and
that sequence is used to produce a protein
or part of a protein.21 Because the
patentability of a DNA sequence under
the Directive depends on the description
of the function that the sequence per-
forms, the ECJ concluded that the patent
protection for the sequence should be
available only if the sequence performs
the function.? Otherwise, the function-
related limitation ("the genetic informa-
tion is contained and performs its func-
tion") included in Article 9 with respect to
the extension of the protection to a mate-
rial containing the genetic information
would become meaningless.' Monsanto's
interpretation would provide protection
to a material as long as the sequence is
contained in the material regardless of the
19 Monsanto ECJ Judgment supra note 12, paragraph 41.
function, which clearly would contradict
the condition in Article 9.
In denying Monsanto's argument, the
ECJ did not clearly distinguish the literal
protection and the extended protection of
a patented DNA sequence. It justified the
function limited protection in terms of
patentability of DNA sequences. Accord-
ingly, this interpretation may mislead
patent professionals and national legisla-
tors that the ECJ created a general rule that
the patent protection is available for a
DNA sequence only if the DNA performs
the function that is disclosed to support
industrial applicability regardless of being
in an isolated form or being incorporated
in a biological material. However, as will
be discussed below, patent protection
should be available regardless of function
described in the specification if the
accused product is a DNA sequence in an
isolated form and the asserted claim liter-
ally covers the sequence.
IV. Analysis of the
Interpretation of the ECJ
1. Failure to Interpret
Article 9 in Context of the
Directive's Structure
In order to analyze the interpretation of
the ECJ, it is helpful to first take a look at
the overall structure of the Directive.
Since Article 9 is part of Chapter II of the
Directive entitled "Scope of Protection,"
20 Recital 23 reads:" Whereas a mere DNA sequence without indication of a function does not contain any technical information
and is therefore not a patentable invention;"
21 Recital 24 reads: 'Whereas, in order to comply with the industrial application criterion it is necessary in cases where a sequence
or partial sequence of a gene is used to produce a protein or part of a protein, to specify which protein or part of a protein is produced
or what function it performs."
22 Monsanto ECJ Judgment supra note 12, paragraph 45.
23 Monsanto ECJ Judgment supra note 12, paragraphs 46 and 47.
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and Chapter II further includes Articles 8,
10, and 11 in addition to Article 9, Article
9 should be interpreted in the context of
the other Articles in Chapter II. However,
the ECJ did not pay much attention to the
structure and these other Articles.
Article 8 (1) of the Directive also pro-
vides an extension of the patent protection
with respect to a biological material that
has specific characteristics resulting from
the invention. This protection is available
if the material is derived from the materi-
al of the invention by propagation or mul-
tiplication and the derived material pos-
sesses the same characteristics as those of
the material of the invention. Article 8 (2)
also provides an extension of the patent
protection with respect to a process for
enabling biological material to have spe-
cific characteristics. The scope of a
process patent producing the biological
material extends to a biological material
directly obtained by the patented process.
In addition, such scope also extends to
any other biological material derived
from the material that is directly obtained
by the patented process through propaga-
tion or multiplication as long as the other
material has the same characteristics
given by the patented process.24
As discussed above, Article 9 also pro-
vides an extension of protection. This
protection applies to a patent on a prod-
uct containing genetic information. This
protection is available for a biological
material if the material contains genetic
information and such information per-
forms its function.
In contrast, Article 10 provides a limita-
tion of the extended protection under the
exhaustion doctrine. Even if a biological
material falls into the extended protec-
tion under Article 8 or 9, the protection is
not available where (1) the material is
legally placed by the patent owner or his
or her licensees on the market in the ter-
ritory of an EU-Member State and (2) the
propagation or multiplication of the
material necessarily results from the
application for which the biological mate-
rial was marketed unless the material is
subsequently used for other propagation
or multiplication. Article 11 also relates
to a limitation of the protection under
Article 8 and 9 with respect to the farmers
privilege under the EU Directive for
plant varieties."
None of these provisions deals with the
literal protection directed to a DNA
sequence in isolated form. Therefore,
these provisions use the verb "extend" to
describe an expansive protection which is
added to the literal protection. Thus, the
ECJ should have clarified that the addi-
tional limitations in these provisions
apply to only the expansive protection
provided in these provisions when it
interpreted Article 9.
2. Improper Importation
of Patentability Rule into
Protection Scope
Instead of the Articles in Chapter II, the
ECJ went to cite Recitals 23 and 24, and
Article 5(3) in Chapter I of the Directive
entitled "Patentability"" Although the
24 See Article 64(2) EPC and 35 U.S.C. 271(g)
25 European Commission Council Regulation No. 15/2008 of 20 December 2007 on Community plant variety rights, 0J EU 11
January 2008, OJEU L8/2
26 Monsanto ECJ Judgment supra note 12, paragraphs 43 and 44.
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effect of recitals in EU legislations is
unclear," the ECJ heavily relied on the
Recitals when it interpreted Article 9. As
the ECJ expressly acknowledged, these
Recitals and Article 5(3) both relate to
patentability of DNA-sequences instead of
the scope of protection.
The ECJ emphasized the requirements
with respect to the function under Recital
23 and Recital 24: a DNA sequence must
indicate a function to meet the condition
of patent eligibility, and said function
must be described in the specification to
meet the condition of industrial applica-
bility if the sequence is used to produce a
protein. In light of Recitals 23 and 24, the
ECJ then interpreted Article 5(3), stating
that patent protection is available for
DNA sequences only if a function per-
formed by the sequence is clearly dis-
closed in the patent specification.
Because the Directive makes it clear that
patent protection of a DNA sequence
depends on the disclosure of a function
performed by the DNA sequence, the ECJ
concluded that no patent protection
should be available for a DNA that can-
not perform the function "for which the
sequence was patented."' This "loss of
protection" was then transferred to the
infringement analysis.
3. ECJ's Incomplete Analysis
and Confusing Interpretation
Not only was the ECJ's analysis improper
by relying on patentability related
recitals, but also its analysis of the recitals
was incomplete because the ECJ failed to
examine Recital 22 that also relates to
patentability of a DNA sequence. Recital
22 first acknowledges the controversy
surrounding patenting full and partial
DNA sequences among EU member
states. Despite of such controversy,
Recital 22 confirms the patentability of
DNA sequences, and requires the member
states to apply the same criteria of
patentability (i.e., novelty, inventive step,
and industrial applicability) to the
sequences as well as subject matter in
other areas of technology, even though
the last sentence of the recital emphasizes
that the original application must include
a description to support industrial appli-
cability, thereby creating special rules for
sequences. In short, Recital 22 of the
Directive prohibits any additional require-
ments for patentability.
Second, regarding Recital 23 on which
ECJ relied for its interpretation, there are
some different nuances in different lan-
guage versions of the recital, which never-
theless result in a significant impact on its
interpretation and thus introduce an
ambiguity with respect to what is meant
by the function. In the English version, the
wording of recital 23 reads: "Whereas a
mere DNA sequence without indication of
a function does not contain any technical
information and is therefore not a
patentable invention" (emphasis added.)
The term "any technical information" is
translated into Dutch: "geen technische
informatie" (no technical information). In
contrast, the German version of Recital 23
reads: "Ein einfacher DNA-Abschnitt ohne
27 Tadas Klimas and JOrate Vaiiukaite, The Law of Recitals in the European Community Legislation, 15 ILSA Journal of
International & Comparative Law, 1 (2008).
28 Monsanto ECJ Judgment supra note 12, paragraph 45
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Angabe einer Funktion enthllt keine Lehre
zum technischen Handeln und stellt deshalb
keine patentierbare Erfindung dar" (A
simple DNA-segment without indication
of a function does not contain a technical
teaching and is therefore not a patentable
invention). This means that a mere DNA
sequence does not constitute an invention
unless a function is given to the sequence.
In other words, a DNA without this func-
tion is essentially excluded from patent eli-
gibility as a natural phenomenon. This is
the same approach argued by the
Department of Justice with respect to the
Myriad case.29 In order to qualify as an
invention, a "function," rather than a mere
presence must be shown.
While the ECJ did not distinguish the
function under Recital 23 and the func-
tion under Recital 24, it is not clear from
the Directive whether the function in
both Recitals is the same. Recital 23 dis-
cusses the function in context of patent
eligibility while Recital 24 discusses the
function in context of industrial applica-
tion, a condition of patentability distinct
from patent eligibility. Recital 24 further-
more provides two options to support the
industrial application of a DNA
sequence, (1) a disclosure to specify a
protein or part of a protein that is pro-
duced by the DNA sequence or (2) a dis-
closure of a function that the DNA per-
forms. However, ECJ did not pay any
attention to the first option.
So what is meant by the term "func-
tion"? Unfortunately, ECJ did not give a
clear answer. Recital 23 does not give any
explanation of the function. Recital 24 at
least gives an explanation that the func-
tion is what is to be described in the spec-
ification to support industrial appli-
cation. Because the ECJ seems to assume
that the functions in these Recitals are the
same, the term "function" in "indication
of a function" in Recital 23 should be
understood as identical to the term "func-
tion" to support "industrial applica-
tion."- As pre-Bilski U.S. courts use the
utility requirement to limit the patent eli-
gibility,31 the ECJ used industrial applica-
tion requirement, which is the European
equivalent of the utility requirement to
limit the patentability, although the scope
of patent eligibility under EPC and EU
Directive must be limited to fields of tech-
nology unlike U.S. patent eligibility.
Recital 22 further specifies, where said
indication of the industrial application
(that is, function) has to be present/posi-
tioned in the application, namely in the
specification (and not the claims). As will
be explained further below, the ECJ
adopted its interpretation while heavily
relying on the "technical information"
wording in the Dutch and English version.
However, the technical information has
nothing to do with industrial application.
The wording of the Directive is inconsistent
and confusing because it requires industri-
al applicability, a condition of patentability,
before the presence of an invention, i.e.
patent eligibility (technical teaching) can be
acknowledged. Also, it is improper for ECJ
to mix a formal requirement: a disclosure of
the function in the specification, and a sub-
stantive requirement: patent eligibility into
the same rules.
In addition, the ECJ introduced a lot of
uncertainty in the interpretation of Article
29 Supra note 1.
30 See Straus: Produktpatente auf DNA-Sequenzen - Eine aktuelle Herausforderung des Patentrechts GRUR 2001, 1016, 1018
31 In re Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526, 31 USPQ 1545 (Fed. Cir. 1994); State Street Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Financial Group Inc., 149
F.3d 1368,47 USPQ2d 1596 (Fed. Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1093, 119 S. Ct. 851, 142 L. Ed. 2d 704 (1999)
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5(3) with respect to its applicability to
non-human genes. The language in
Article 5(1) and (2) makes it clear that the
Article only relates to an element includ-
ing a full or partial sequence of gene iso-
lated from a human body or an element
produced by a technical process to have
the same structure of the isolated element
of a human body.32 Accordingly, one may
read "a sequence or a partial sequence of
a gene" in Article 5(3) to include only a
sequence that is isolated from a human
body or produced by a technical process
to have the same structure of the isolated
sequence. If this interpretation is correct,
since the '090 patent has nothing to do
with a human DNA sequence, the ECJ
was incorrect to rely on Article 5(3) in
order to support its function-limited
scope of protection.
This interpretation is supported by the
German legislator's interpretation of
Article 5(3). In revising the German
Patent Law ("PatG") to implement the
Directive, the legislator added Section Ia
of PatG in order to implement Article 5 of
the Directive. They made the same mis-
take in importing the patentability
requirement into the scope of protection
because this new section introduced an
additional patentability requirement, a
description requirement for the claims
with respect to gene patents: "when the
invention is a sequence of a gene, the
composition of which is identical to the
composition of a natural sequence of a
human gene, the use thereof, for which the
industrial application is concretely
described in the specification according to
§ la (3) of PatG, has to be included into
the patent claim."a (emphasis added)
Because of this requirement to include the
use or function of human gene patents
into the claims, German courts will have
to apply a similar function-limited scope
of protection for gene patents.
Nevertheless, this restricted patent scope
would only apply to a claim directed a
DNA sequence from a human gene,
because the PatG makes clear that this
additional claim limitation only applies to
a DNA sequence of a human gene.
Because neither Article 5(3) of the
Directive nor Section la (3) PatG express-
ly include an express limitation with
respect to DNA sequences, contrary to the
express limitations in Article 5(1) and 2)
and Section la (1) (2) and (4) PatG, it
seems possible to adopt the ECJ's inter-
pretation to apply the additional require-
ment to all genes. Therefore, the ECJ's
interpretation introduced a lot of uncer-
tainty whether the additional claim limi-
tation requirement should apply to a
DNA sequence of non human genes such
as a plant.
Further, there is no basis in the
Directive for justifying the ECJ's importa-
tion of patentability rules into the analysis
of the scope of protection. As will be dis-
cussed below, this importation introduces
a lot of uncertainty not only to patent
scope but also patentability with respect
to DNA sequence patents.
32 Article 5(1), supra note 2
33 German Patent Act (PatG), Section la(4). For a discussion of this additional requirement, see Jan Krauss, (Die Effekte der
Umsetzung der Richtlinie fiber den rechtlichen Schutz biotechnologischer Erfindungen auf die deutsche Praxis im Bereich dieser
Erfindungen) Mitt. 11/2005, page 491, point 2.2
34 Concurring with the ECJ: Tilman GRUR 2004, 561, 564 as "hybrid compound protection", but in relation to human sequences
and the biological function of the gene
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4. Proper Interpretation of Article
9 and Infringement Analysis
Despite its incomplete analysis and
improper reliance on Article 5(3), the ECJ
arrived at the correct result that - accord-
ing to the Directive - the availability of a
patent protection for a DNA sequence in a
biological material should depend on the
disclosure of the function as performed
by the DNA."
It was actually unnecessary for the ECJ
to import the patentability rule into the
rule to determine the scope of protection,
resulting in a special rule for the protec-
tion of DNA sequence patents. Had the
ECJ simply properly interpreted the
wordings of both the claims in the '090
patent and Article 9 of the Directive, the
ECJ would have reached the same conclu-
sion of non-infringement without intro-
ducing a lot of uncertainty.
The Court of The Hague referred a
question only with respect to the scope of
Claim 6 in the '090 patent.' Claim 6
depends on Claim 3 that further depends
on Claim 1.1 The preamble of Claim 1
reads: "an isolated DNA sequence encod-
ing for an EPSPS enzyme. Therefore, the
wording of Claim 6 is directed to a specif-
ic chemical substance consisting of a
nucleic acid encoding the EPSPS enzyme.
Because the claim requires the DNA
sequence to be isolated from a biological
material, this molecule cannot have a bio-
logical function. The isolated molecule is
removed from the chromosome of the
plant, and merely consists of the bases
35 Monsanto ECJ Judgment supra note 12, paragraph 44.
36 Monsanto ECJ Judgment supra note 12, paragraph 32, (2).
37 For these claims, see supra note 6.
encoding for the EPSPS enzyme, i.e. is a
single "short" chemical compound. Thus,
the claim does not literally cover any
DNA-molecule when it is not contained
in the chromosome where it can perform
a biological function.3 Since the isolated
DNA sequence such as one in Monsanto
has neither a biological function nor -
outside of in vitro uses - the function
described in the specification, the ECJ's
interpretation casts a doubt whether
patent protection is available for isolated
DNA sequence is despite of the clear
endorsement of patentability under
Article 3 Paragraph 2 of the Directive
except for a DNA sequence which has a
diagnositic use or a use as a primer in
vitro reaction.
Obviously, the Directive was drafted to
acknowledge the double nature of DNA as
a chemical compound and as a carrier of
information.' This is one reason for the
extension of the protection under Article 9,
adding additional scope to the otherwise
very limited protection of an isolated DNA
compound as such, so that the compound
claim covers all materials (and thus is
extended), in which the claimed com-
pound (that is, the DNA-sequence) is
incorporated." Because of the added pro-
tection, the whole chromosome of an
organism (containing the respective DNA-
sequence), and even an organism as such
could be protected by such a claim. In
order to limit the expansive scope of pro-
tection, Article 9 adds a condition for the
additional protection: the genetic informa-
38 As correctly concluded by Justice Punfrey in the parallel UK-proceedings, Monsanto vs Cargill 120071 EWHC 2257 (Pat).
39 See, for example, Tilman GRUR 2004, 561, 562
40 See, for example, Krauss, supra note 33, page 494, point 2.6
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tion as introduced in the biological materi-
al has to perform its function (which sup-
ports industrial applicability).
The following simple diagram shall
depict the relationship between the liter-
al scope of an isolated DNA sequence
and its extended scope of protection
under Article 9:
When prosecuting patents, patent
attorneys frequently have to deal with a
very similar problem resulting from the
double-nature of DNA. Patent examiners
usually reject all patent claims that are
directed to DNA-sequences, if the claims
include an "open" transition term (e.g.,
"comprising") in contrast to a "closed"
transition term ("consisting of"). In order
to overcome this rejection, the examiners
almost always demand to add the term
"isolated" to DNA sequence claims in
order to prevent a claim to cover "in
situ" DNA-sequences. Therefore, Article
9 should not be read to prohibit an
absolute compound protection for DNA-
sequences (as natural substances). If a
claim is properly interpreted, Article 9
should be read to actually extend the
Additional protection
as a reward for the
inventor for P_
identifying the
function of the DNA-
molecule, outside of
"providing" it
scope of a chemical compound in order
to compensate for the scope of the isolat-
ed compound that is actually very limit-
ed.
In summary, when the patent claim at
issue is properly interpreted and Article 9
is correctly interpreted, the soybean meal
in Monsanto as imported indeed does not
infringe the claim. A claim directed to an
isolated DNA sequence, i.e., a chemical
compound does not literally cover the
DNA sequence contained in the soybean
meal because the sequence is not isolated
from the chromosome in the meal.
Because the DNA sequence in the import-
ed soybean meal does (and can) not per-
form the function disclosed in the specifi-
cation, the additional protection under
Article 9 is not available for the meal.
Whether the soybean meal falls into the
definition under Article 2 (1)a of the
Directive because the meal is no longer
capable of reproducing itself or being
reproduced in a biological system as
required in the definition."1 Thus, the ECJ
could have rejected the additional protec-










Small scope of protection for an
isolated DNA-molecule (compound
claim), i.e. no function
41 Joseph Straus, The Scope of Protection Conferred by European Patents on Transgenic Plants and on Methods for Their Production,
Festschrift for Marianne Levin 643, 647 (2008). Prof. Straus gives a further clarification for the requirement of performing the function:
A product meets the requirement if the product is used because of the function resulting from the genetic information carried by the
DNA.
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the ECJ made a mistake in relying on
Article 5(3) to limit the scope of protection
under Article 9, the Court was correct in
limiting the additional protection by the
function and finding that there was no
infringement.
It is likely that ECJ's adoption of the
restrictive protection scope for gene
patents is a response to the political pres-
sure coming from European politics. As
acknowledged in Recital 22, gene patent-
ing has been controversial and continues
to be controversial, even after the imple-
mentation of the Directive in nearly all
EU-member states. In fact, the scope of
protection for a DNA-sequence has been
one of the most frequently debated issues.
As these claims provide absolute protec-
tion as a chemical compound, the alleged
"overcompensation" derived from such
protection was heavily criticized as
exceeding the contribution made by the
inventor.4 2 However, as discussed, this
argument seems to be based on an
improper interpretation of claims directed
to an isolated DNA sequence.
In essence, the special rule that the ECJ
and Advocate General, Paolo Mengozzi
adopted is in line with the interpretation
of Article 9 of the Directive advanced by
German patent scholars. These scholars
proposed to limit the scope of protection
by the function as specified in the descrip-
tion of the patent specification.43
Nevertheless, all these critics seemed to
have overlooked that there can be a
"peaceful coexistence" in case of the
42 e.g. G. Knig, in: Festschr. f. Reimar Kdnig, 2003, p. 267
scope of protection for a claim directed to
an isolated DNA sequence consisting of a)
the literal scope of the "actual invention"
for identifying and producing a DNA
sequence plus b) the extended scope as the
"reward" for identifying a function i.e.,
the actual industrial applicability for the
DNA sequence.
The ECJ was of course aware of the
chemical/information carrier double
nature of a DNA sequence, and thus
adopted the function-limited protection
scope. However, the interpretation of
Article 9 by the ECJ was more expansive
than what was proposed by the German
patent scholars because the scholars dis-
cussed the function-limited protection
scope only with respect to human DNA
sequences.4 The function-limited scope
proposed by a German scholar covers the
functions disclosed in the description of
the specification as well as functions that
obviously relate to the disclosed func-
tions." In contrast, in Monsanto, the ECJ
opinion can be read to apply the function-
limited scope of protection to all DNA-
sequences, irrespective of whether they are
of human origin, are used for encoding a
protein, or are used as a (diagnostic) "tool".
At least, ECJ provided a clarification
regarding the interpretation of Article 9 in
making clear that the function required for
patent protection is the function specified
in the specification for supporting the
industrial application." Before Monsanto,
there was a debate in the patent com-
munity whether a function as recited in
43 See, e.g., Meyer-Dulheuer, GRUR 2000, 181, Nieder, Mitt 2001, 99; Nieder, Mitt 2001, 238; Feuerlein, GRUR 2001, 563, Tilman
GRUR 2004, 561
44 Tilman GRUR 2004, 561, 564
45 This concept to interpret the scope of protection seems interestingly similar to the old "inventive contribution" concept that the
BGH frequently used to determine the scope of patented inventions before the introduction of amendments regarding the scope of pro-
tection in 1968.
46 Monsanto ECJ Judgment supra note 12, paragraph 45.
VOL 93, NO 2 A SPECIAL RULE FOR COMPOUND PROTECTFION 201
202 JAN B. KRAUSS AND TOSHIKO TAKENAKA ipros
the Directive could relate to the biological
function of the DNA sequence." The ECJ
put an end to this debate by stating that
function is not the "biological function" of
a DNA, but is the function of a DNA
described in the specification to support
industrial application.
It is interesting to note that the ECJ paid
such a special attention to the term "techni-
cal information" regarding the function in
Recital 23 and focused its analysis on the
information as "stored" in the DNA. As a
result, since the DNA has to be "read out
"or "implemented" to perform its function
for a patent protection, ECJ's "function lim-
ited protection scope" can even be
described as "information-bound com-
pound protection".
This requirement of implementing
information by introducing into a biolog-
ical material parallels to a similar require-
ment for inventions which are related to
carriers of information in other fields of
technology, namely computer-imple-
mented software inventions. Like an iso-
lated DNA sequence, software in the
abstract detached from an activating
medium is mere information and does not
qualify for patent protection because it
does not have a technical character' or
does not relate to any technical field."
Such software will have a technical char-
acter only if it is read out or implemented
in an activating medium such as a
machine readable memory and a hard-
ware resource to provide a function to
solve a technical problem. Therefore, the
EPC requires inventors to include a dis-
closure of the technical function into the
specification" and the essential technical
features into the claims." Although
arguably not identical, the German
approach is quite similar.52
The US patent system applies the same
requirement because software in the
abstract is mere information and thus
excluded from patent eligibility as an
abstract idea. 3 This is because software
in the abstract cannot be inserted into a
machine or downloaded from Internet
unless it is expressed as a computer-read-
able copy and thus does not perform any
function." Unless the information repre-
sented in the software is implemented
and applied to a specific field of technolo-
gy and addresses a need in the technical
field, it remains an abstract idea and thus
is not patentable."
With respect to the scope of protection,
software in the abstract does not enjoy
any patent protection because it does not
have any function. Along these lines, the
US Supreme Court made it clear that one
cannot commit contributory infringement
with respect to software in the abstract,
because the software does not constitute a
47 See, for example EPO case law in re ICOS, OJ EPO 6/2002, page 293, T 0898/05 of 7 July 2006, referring to e.g. T 870/04 of 11
May 2005
48 EPO Examination Guidelines ("EPC Rule") Chapter IV, Part C, 1.2(ii).
49 Implementation Regulations to the Convention on the Grant of European Patents, ("EPC Rule") Rule 42(1)(a).
50 Rule 42(1)(c) EPC
51 Rule 43(1) EPC
52 BGH, GRUR 2004, 667 - Elektronischer Zahlungsverkehr; GRUR 2009, 479 - Steuerungseinrichfungfar Untersuchungsmodalititen
53 Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218 (2010).
54 Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T Corp. 549 U.S. 991 (2006).
55 Research Corp. Techs. v. Microsoft Corp., 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 24984 (Fed. Cir. Dec. 8, 2010)
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component under 35 U.S.C. §271(f), even
if such software is incorporated as part of
a machine or process claim.'
In contrast, as noted above, an isolated
DNA in vitro may enjoy a protection as a
chemical compound with a scope that is
independent from its function, but, as
stated above, such protection usually in
practice is very limited or even worthless.
V. Possible Impact of
Monsanto on the Patentability
of Gene Patents
In Monsanto, the ECJ primarily decided
on infringement issues with respect to the
scope of patent protection for a gene
patent under Article 9 of the Directive.
Therefore, in theory the decision should
not result in any impact on patentability of
DNA sequence patents. Nevertheless, in
practice it is very likely that the decision
will indeed have a quite significant impact
on the patentability of DNA sequence
patents. This is because the ECJ extensive-
ly discussed the conditions of patentabili-
ty with respect to DNA sequence patents.
Such impact is also inevitable throughout
EU member states since the ECJ empha-
sized the necessity to further enhance
harmonization of patent protection, and
rejected any flexibility for allowing EU
member states to adopt an absolute com-
pound protection for a claim directing to a
DNA sequence."
The legislators of all EU member states
must take into account of the impact of
Monsanto and make necessary amend-
ments to their national patent law because
Article 1(1) of the Directive requires them
to meet the obligations under the
Directive. They may read Monsanto to
require amendments to national patent
laws with respect to the scope of patent
eligibility and the proper drafting of
claims. Currently, an applicant can obtain
a patent from the European Patent Office
with a claim directed to a DNA sequence
without a function limitation. In spite of
no functional limitation in the claim term,
such claim will be interpreted to have a
function limited scope of protection
under Monsanto. Article 69 of the EPC
requires the extent of the patent protec-
tion to be determined by the claims
although the specification and drawings
shall be used for interpreting the claims. "
Therefore, the ECJ's function-limited
scope of protection is in serious conflict
with this fundamental principle because
it requires the patent offices and courts to
read a limitation into the claims based on
a function as described in the specifica-
tion. In order to avoid this conflict,
national legislators may introduce an
amendment to their national patent laws
in order to introduce said function-limita-
tion into the claim when a claim is direct-
ed to a DNA sequence.
Such requirement to include such limi-
tation will lead to a multitude of legal and
technical uncertainties in patent practice
in EU member states, including Germany.
As discussed above, the German legisla-
56 Supra note 54, Microsoft Corp.
57 Monsanto ECJ Judgment supra note 12, paragraph 63.
58 Article 69(1) EPC
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tor revised PatG and included §1a PatG."'
However, the requirements under the
German PatG are different from the ECJ
requirements under Monsanto, as the
requirements under Monsanto apply to
any DNA sequence, i.e. not only to a DNA
sequence from a human gene' when the
DNA has the composition identical to the
composition of a natural sequence of a
human gene."' This additional require-
ment for claim drafting is inconsistent
with Article 5 (3) of the Directive because
the article only requires a disclosure of the
industrial application, i.e., the function of
a sequence or partial sequence of a human
gene in the patent specification (not in
claims). However, it is likely that the
German legislator imported the scope of
protection requirement into patentability
as the ECJ had done in Monsanto.
Any such requirement to include a
functional limitation into the claim would
also have a significant impact on the
patent practice under the EPC because
EPC requires using the Directive and its
legislative history as supplemental means
for interpreting the EPC rules relating to
patent applications for biotechnological
inventions.62 Therefore, if Monsanto is
understood to interpret the Directive in a
way to require an amendment to the
national patent laws in EU member states,
the EPC has to be amended, too. This
would have an effect far beyond the EU
because many non-EU member states are
members of EPC.
Furthermore, the ECJ in Monsanto can
be read to reject the German scholar's pro-
posal which always interprets a claim to
be limited by the description of the speci-
fication if a claim is directed to a DNA
sequence." Such a special rule of claim
interpretation is in conflict not only with
the fundamental rule of the scope of pro-
tection under Art. 69 EPC, but also with
the national case-law relating to the inter-
pretation claims in national patents, and
would introduce a lot of legal uncertainty.
As discussed above, if a DNA sequence
claim is properly interpreted, such amend-
ments are not at all necessary. Even with-
out such limitation, the literal scope of a
DNA sequence claim is very limited even
if an "absolute" compound protection is
available. Only the extension of such
claim to a biological material should be
limited by the function described in the
specification. These two parts of the scope
can exist in parallel without causing any
problems with current patent law doc-
trines, and even would not conflict with
an analysis of the scope based on the doc-
trine of equivalence.
In addition, it is important to note that
the ECJ decided that its decision to pre-
clude an absolute compound for DNA
sequences also applies to patents that were
issued before the effective date of the
Directive." Therefore, regardless of the
date of grant, all patent owners can "sud-
denly" no longer enforce a DNA-sequence
patent unless the sequence performs the
59 §la PatG.
60 §la (2) PatG
61 §1a (4) PatG
62 As recently done so, for example, in the decision of the Enlarged Board of Appeals at the EPO, G1/08 and as stated in Rule 26(1)
EPC
63 As apparently proposed by Tilman, footnote 17
64 Monsanto ECJ Judgment supra note 12, paragraph 66.
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function disclosed to support industrial
applicability. In an infringement proceed-
ing, this new scope of protection creates a
number of issues, such as, what is the func-
tion, and whether the patented DNA can
perform the function. To add to the confu-
sion, the Court of The Hague made it clear
that a DNA sequence does not need to per-
form its function continuously" How will
the courts now distinguish a DNA
sequence which temporarily stops per-
forming its function from a sequence
which permanently stops performing its
function? The function limited protection
scope also introduces uncertainty in patent
validity because accused infringers may
challenge the validity arguing that a claim
directed to an isolated DNA sequence
without a functional limitation is invalid
under Monsanto. In order to overcome this
challenge, patent owners may need to
amend the claim scope by introducing a
limitation of the function that the DNA
sequence performs. Regardless of possible
litigation, patent owners may feel it is nec-
essary to make such an amendment to
avoid validity challenges.
Finally, applicants should now expect a
more rigorous examination, if their appli-
cations include a claim directed to a DNA
sequence. In order to meet both patent
eligibility and industrial application stan-
dard, it is advisable to include a broader
disclosure of the function(s) of a DNA
sequence, and even data to support the
function.' Such disclosure is helpful for
overcoming a rejection if the EPO and/or
national patent offices in the EU member
states decide to require introducing the
function(s) into the claims as a limitation.
Even if a patent has already been granted
to claims which do not include a function-
al limitation, Monsanto already limits the
scope of protection of these claims to the
function that is described in the specifica-
tion in order to support industrial appli-
cability. This function bound protection
scope applies to all DNA-sequences
regardless of its origin (human body or
not) as well as regardless of its use (as a
research tool or for encoding a protein.)
VI. Conclusions
After all, Monsanto certainly is a very
extreme case for "testing" absolute com-
pound protection where a practical threat
from the infringement is far from immi-
nent. The claimed DNA sequence is
"dead" (non-functional) as long as it
remains in the soybean meal. Therefore,
alleged infringers in practice would not
have been able to enjoy the benefit of the
invention unless they would isolate the
patented DNA sequence from the meal,
and transfer it into a different biological
material in which the sequence performs
the function. Despite the exceptional
nature of the dispute, Monsanto gave the
ECJ an opportunity to develop a special
rule which now is applicable to all claims
directed to any DNA sequence. Because
of the ECJ's improper reliance on the part
of the Directive relating to patentability to
support its restricted protection scope, the
interpretation may result in significant
65 Monsanto ECJ Judgment supra note 12, paragraph 28
66 And not to rely on the choice as provided by Recital 24
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impacts not only on the scope of protec-
tion but also on the patentability of a
claim directed to a DNA sequence. The
impacts may further lead to amendments
to national patent laws not only in the EU
but also EPC member states. Patent own-
ers and applicants are now required to
closely follow the case law in national
courts in EC member states, as well as the
EPO, and have to be prepared to face
additional requirements that may result
from Monsanto, if their patents or patent
applications include a claim directed to a
DNA sequence.
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